Elections Without Tears: Prepping for the 2020 Presidential Elections in Ghana

Focus, Focus!
The political chatter in Ghana is not focused on the 2020 presidential and parliamentary elections at this time. Instead of a full-on discussion of how to ensure a conflict-free and credible elections, political commentary, as far as elections are concerned, is directed at one juicy story: the possible impeachment of the Electoral Commissioner and two of her deputies, who seem to be locked in some kind of career suicide pact. This is unfortunate; for, while the leadership of the national electoral commission is certainly crucial for the success of elections, a tunnel-vision focus that relegates equally important aspects to the periphery is short-sighted. Worse, the current controversy seems to be driven by partisan interests rather than a desire to truly reform the electoral commission.  One may argue that there is no rush into discussion of elections because, after all, 2020 is two and a half years away. This line of thinking is unwise for two reasons. First, two and a half years is not the distant future; it will be here before we know it. Second, discussions on electoral reform are best conducted when elections are not looming over the horizon. As past experience in Ghana and elsewhere has demonstrated, debate on electoral issues in the year before elections inevitably gets mired in unproductive partisanship. So, to avoid an election-year debacle, serious debate should begin now, while the impeachment process wends it way through the judicial process. I propose below five topics worthy of dispassionate national debate right now.

First, ROPAA: The participation in national elections of Ghanaian citizens resident abroad is a topic that excites controversy and inflames partisan passions. Supporters of diaspora voting rights, mostly adherents of the governing NPP, point to the contribution of the Ghanaian diaspora to various aspects of national life, from the economy to knowledge and technology transfer to football. Opponents, on the NDC side, emphasise the financial and logistical challenges of organising elections outside the country.  Many outsiders, especially other Africans, who find our electoral system relatively sophisticated, find the controversy inexplicable. However, controversial or not, the Representation of Peoples Amendment Act (ROPAA) of 2007 has enshrined the voting rights of the diaspora into law. The present government has indicated its desire to see ROPAA implemented for the 2020 elections. Furthermore, following a suit brought by a supporter, the Supreme Court in 2017 instructed the electoral commission (EC) to accelerate the application of the law.  Yet, there is very little apparent movement from the EC towards this goal while it remains enmeshed in multiple disputes and controversies. As organising the first diaspora vote will certainly face many challenges, vigorous debate should start now to ensure its smooth implementation by 2020.

Second, transparency in electoral operations: Overall, the electoral process in Ghana is remarkably transparent and inclusive. Through the inter-party advisory committee (IPAC), political parties and key stakeholders are kept apprised of operational processes and key decision throughout the electoral cycle. The introduction and increasing reliability of biometric registration have increased public confidence and enhanced transparency at the polling station level. Reforms introduced prior to the 2016 elections as a result of court challenges have boosted the role of presiding officers at constituency level in the declaration of results, thus bringing openness closer to the people. But there is on crucial step in the electoral process that has defied openness and clarity over all electoral cycles: the declaration of final results.  By law, the electoral commissioner is the only one authorised to declare the final results of presidential and parliamentary elections. In practice, this has translated to tallying results from the constituencies in a centralised “strong room” at EC headquarters. Although representatives of political parties and other independent observers are allowed to witness the tallying, the process remains opaque in the public mind. The notion that EC officials actively “cook” results of the governing party is a constant refrain. This is the Achilles heel of the electoral process in Ghana, which has dogged every election since the advent of the fourth republic in 1992.

Ghana could learn from other countries to resolve this nagging problem. Nigerian electoral officials and political observers are openly admiring of Ghana’s electoral process and admit to learning from it to improve their own elections. So, Ghana can return the favour and learn from a positive experience of its larger neighbour. The Nigerian electoral commission managed the announcement of final results of the April 2015 Presidential and legislative in a manner that conveyed transparency.  The parade of presiding officers, preponderantly vice-chancellors and eminent professors, to announce the results of constituencies they oversaw added gravitas and reassurance to the sense of transparency. The spectacle was the opposite of the “strong room” concept. In the honoured tradition of Ghana-Nigeria one-upmanship, Ghana must try to outdo Nigeria in the electoral transparency sweepstakes by taking the final tallying out into the open. What a sight it would be if results could be projected onto big screens at stadiums across the countries and broadcast live on national and international TV for all to see.  The knowledge and technology now exist to achieve this. Furthermore, as the declaration of results has effectively been decentralised to the constituency level and constituency results are available to the media and election watchdogs within a few hours after the close of voting, results can be released progressively as they become available. If this is done (as indeed happens in many advanced democracies) citizens will not have to sit on tenterhooks for 48 or 72 hours after polls close while results are being tallied and verified (whatever that means) before final release. This will reduce tension in the country.  It will also ease pressure on the electoral commissioner, who must bear the onerous and thankless responsibility of unveiling the individual elected by the people to lead them.

Third, expeditious resolution of electoral disputes: Overall, election-day violence in the fourth republic has been rare, despite media-fuelled high tension in the run up to elections. But there have been high-profile instances of disruption of the electoral calendar due to disputes. In 2012, a dispute over the election of NDC candidate John Mahama dragged on at the Supreme Court for eight months before it was finally determined in his favour. This was after Mr. Mahama, declared winner by the EC, had already been sworn in and continued to exercise the functions of President. This situation is clearly awkward and its recurrence must be avoided at all cost. To this end, a judicial regime must be instituted that enables election-related litigation to be resolved expeditiously, before newly elected officials are sworn in. This may call for instituting special election courts to address election-related litigation in a timely manner. Elected officials, once judicially cleared, can then focus on governance and service delivery.

The quick resolution of electoral disputes also has implications for post-election transitions, especially when it involves a change from one party to another, as has happened three times in the fourth republic. In 2008, disruption at a few polling stations in Tain constituency led to an unprecedented “third round” of voting, which pitted the NPP’s Nana Akuffo Addo against then opposition leader Professor Atta Mills. The rescheduled election, held on 28th December, had the nation sitting on tenterhooks and messed up everybody’s Christmas and New Year. Thus there was an indecently hasty transition from the election to the inauguration of the new President on 7th January 2009 as constitutionally mandated. In an apparent effort to avoid a recurrence of the Tain situation, legislation was tabled in mid-2016 to move the elections from December to November, presumably to allow for sufficient time for a transition even if there is a “third round” of voting. The timing of the amendment, tabled when partisan tensions and suspicion were at fever pitch, probably influenced the decision to reject it at the time. So, this is not a fatal setback. If another bill can be introduced in 2018 or early 2019, which proposes a decent time lag of, say, six to eight weeks between the election and the inauguration of the incoming administration, it would have a greater chance of success.  Such an amendment would kill two birds with one stone: it would allow time for resolution of electoral disputes and enable a decent transition to ensure a smooth transfer of power and continuity of administration.

Fourth, Creating A Viable Electoral Register:  Throughout Africa, establishing a viable and credible electoral register is a contentious issue. Ghana has not been spared its share of voter registration controversies. Each electoral cycle embroils the country in much sound and fury over who is eligible to register to vote, with various political parties and even the EC itself facing accusations of fraudulent manipulation through padding electoral rolls, registration of underage voters, importation of voters from neighbouring countries and other shenanigans. Progressive digitalization, which has enabled the creation of a biometric electoral register, has minimized but not eliminated the suspicions and challenges. The root of the problem may be traced to the absence of viable national identification and civil registration databases, which could form the backbone of an electoral register. In the absence of a viable national identification system, conducting voter registration in the last year before elections, in the midst of election campaigns, is a sure recipe for controversy.  Fortunately, Ghana appears to be on the verge of launching its first comprehensive national identification system. Thus, civil society groups and other advocates for fair and credible elections will do well to mount pressure on the National Identification Agency (NIA) to rush the development and implementation of the long-awaited system.

Finally, Ensuring Peace and Security for Elections: Ghana’s national peace architecture, formulated with the collaboration of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has been hailed throughout Africa and beyond. It has inspired other countries, such as Nigeria, which drew upon the Ghana experience to create its own National Peace Committee for the April 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. The peace architecture, which finds expression through a multi-level Ghana Peace Council, provides a robust framework to detect and counter any currents of hate or threats to peace and security. But new threats are emerging, which the National Peace Council must confront before the next electoral cycle.  The peace architecture needs to be re-energised and strengthened, especially at regional and district levels. Some recent developments should particularly concern peace advocates in the run up to the 2020 elections. First is the recent upsurge in violent crime, notably armed robbery and the phenomenon of land guards, which have elicited the intervention of the President himself. The institutionalisation and apparent tolerance of vigilante groups sponsored by major political parties constitute a significant security threat, particularly as they undermine national security institutions. Ghana also cannot ignore the unstable security situation across its borders. The sporadic terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, the months-long opposition agitation against the ruling government in Togo, and the restlessness of elements of the Ivorian army drawn from the ex-rebellion must all be watched carefully. Therefore, the national peace architecture should emphasise strengthened alliances with media watchdog institutions, such as the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), and regional security and early warning organisations like the West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP). The MFWA’s media monitoring program ahead of the 2016 elections publicly named and shamed purveyors of intemperate speech and was credited with minimizing hate speech in broadcast media. WANEP’s pan-ECOWAS coverage and analysis can provide early warning on threats from Ghana’s neighbourhood. The early warning should include monitoring the flow of small arms across the ECOWAS region.

In conclusion, Ghana can minimize election-related acrimony by avoiding an election-year gridlock of needed electoral reforms. The authorities should accelerate implementation of the national identification system. Finally, peace advocacy effort efforts should address both domestic security challenges, including party-sponsored vigilantism, and potential sub-regional threats arising from instability in countries across its borders.