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The announcement by Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara (with French President Emmanuel Macron by his side) that the eight countries of UEMOA have decided to drop the CFA Franc (FCFA) in favour of the proposed ECOWAS common currency, the Eco, has elicited bewilderment, controversy and excitement in equal measure. Indeed African nationalists and intellectuals have long considered the FCFA as one of the most blatant symbols of France’s neo-colonial stranglehold on its former colonies in West and central Africa. (Indeed FCFA originally stood for Franc des colonies françaises d’Afrique.)

Three aspects were considered particularly galling: 1) The CFA countries were obliged to deposit at least 50 percent of their foreign exchange reserves with the French central bank. In the past year alone, Francophone countries transferred some EUR 19 billion to the French treasury through this mechanism. 2) The French Ministry of Finance exercised effective control over the currency by appointing members to the board of the nominally independent Central Bank of West Africa, (BCEAO). In Reality, the Bank of France, headquartered in Paris, effectively controlled the bank and, through it, the currency. 3) By relinquishing control of their currency, Francophone countries deprived themselves of the possibility of using monetary policy as a tool of macroeconomic management. This is an issue both of sovereignty and development.

Given these obvious neo-colonialist traits how did the FCFA survive all these decades and why did African countries continue to embrace it even after independence in the 60s? The answer may be found in a fourth feature of the currency, its stability and convertibility. From its birth in 1945, the FCFA was pegged to the French franc, until 1999, when it became tied to the Euro, after France joined the Euro zone.

The stability and convertibility of the FCFA, assured by its link to the French Franc and the Euro, have been the poison pill that hooked African countries onto their neo-colonial currency. As they have watched the sovereign currencies of their neighbours (Nigeria, Ghana, Zaire/Congo, Liberia, etc) crumble in value and be shunned on global currency exchanges, many must have secretly sighed, “Thank God for the FCFA”. Indeed Francophone countries in West and Central Africa have profited from the weaker currencies of their neighbours, whose citizens have continued to transfer or smuggle export produce, precious minerals, even human capital in exchange for the FCFA.

So, what has all this got to do with the Eco? And why the brouhaha over Francophone West African countries ditching the FCFA for the Eco? From the inception of ECOWAS, a single currency has been viewed as one of the key pillars of the community, along with free movement and the right of settlement. The importance of a single currency in promoting regional trade and integration is acknowledged by all. Yet the attainment of a single currency has remained elusive – ECOWAS’ own holy grail.

Two main reasons account for this. The first was the inability of most non-FCFA countries to meet the convergence criteria established by the West African Monetary Union (WAMU). These are: single digit inflation; fiscal deficit below 4 percent; gross foreign exchange reserves sufficient to cover three months’ worth of imports; and central bank deficit-financing of no more than 10% of tax revenues.
The second, and arguably weightier, reason was the status of the FCFA within the proposed common currency. It was considered highly improbable that Francophone countries would ditch the FCFA in order to join the Eco. The entanglement of the FCFA with the French treasury added to the complexity.

That is why the announcement by Presidents Ouattara (as current Chairman of UEMOA) and Macron is so significant. First, it addresses the first three neo-colonialist traits of the FCFA and technically transfers sovereign control from France to the UEMOA countries. Thus, the decision to join the Eco now becomes an African political and economic choice, not the prerogative of the French Ministry of Finance and Central Bank. And, apparently, those countries have now chosen to adopt the Eco.

However, the Ouattara-Macron announcement raises as many questions as it answers. First, there is the question of the convertibility of the Eco and the suggestion by UEMOA (through Ouattara) that the new currency be tied to the Euro. Surely, the eight UEMOA countries cannot decide such an important issue on behalf of the 14 countries that constitute ECOWAS, including sub-regional giants Nigeria and Ghana. One can only presume this is a negotiating position and, possibly, an attempt by France to continue to exercise some leverage over the new currency. That would be presumptuous and preposterous.

The well calibrated language of the 21st December communique of the 56th ECOWAS summit that merely “takes note of the major changes underway in UEMOA” makes this clear. The statement goes further to underline that these changes should facilitate the integration of UEMOA into the single currency. In other words, the Eco cannot be hijacked by a segment of ECOWAS. The Community alone and as a whole will determine path to the full adoption of the Eco. The 28th December statement issued by the Ghana government, while welcoming UEMOA’s decision and recommitting Ghana to the adoption of the Eco, also underlines the ECOWAS authorities’ decision to adopt a flexible exchange rate mechanism for the Eco.

So, bottom line: the decision by UEMOA to replace the FCFA with the Eco is historic. While the manner of the announcement may have been somewhat clumsy, it certainly removes a major obstacle to the implementation of the ECOWAS common currency. ECOWAS leaders must now pursue two priorities to attain this holy grail: encourage all countries to hasten to meet the convergence criteria, and assert West Africa’s sovereignty by adopting an exchange rate mechanism that purges it from all vestiges of neo-colonialism.

Focus, Focus!
The political chatter in Ghana is not focused on the 2020 presidential and parliamentary elections at this time. Instead of a full-on discussion of how to ensure a conflict-free and credible elections, political commentary, as far as elections are concerned, is directed at one juicy story: the possible impeachment of the Electoral Commissioner and two of her deputies, who seem to be locked in some kind of career suicide pact. This is unfortunate; for, while the leadership of the national electoral commission is certainly crucial for the success of elections, a tunnel-vision focus that relegates equally important aspects to the periphery is short-sighted. Worse, the current controversy seems to be driven by partisan interests rather than a desire to truly reform the electoral commission.  One may argue that there is no rush into discussion of elections because, after all, 2020 is two and a half years away. This line of thinking is unwise for two reasons. First, two and a half years is not the distant future; it will be here before we know it. Second, discussions on electoral reform are best conducted when elections are not looming over the horizon. As past experience in Ghana and elsewhere has demonstrated, debate on electoral issues in the year before elections inevitably gets mired in unproductive partisanship. So, to avoid an election-year debacle, serious debate should begin now, while the impeachment process wends it way through the judicial process. I propose below five topics worthy of dispassionate national debate right now.

First, ROPAA: The participation in national elections of Ghanaian citizens resident abroad is a topic that excites controversy and inflames partisan passions. Supporters of diaspora voting rights, mostly adherents of the governing NPP, point to the contribution of the Ghanaian diaspora to various aspects of national life, from the economy to knowledge and technology transfer to football. Opponents, on the NDC side, emphasise the financial and logistical challenges of organising elections outside the country.  Many outsiders, especially other Africans, who find our electoral system relatively sophisticated, find the controversy inexplicable. However, controversial or not, the Representation of Peoples Amendment Act (ROPAA) of 2007 has enshrined the voting rights of the diaspora into law. The present government has indicated its desire to see ROPAA implemented for the 2020 elections. Furthermore, following a suit brought by a supporter, the Supreme Court in 2017 instructed the electoral commission (EC) to accelerate the application of the law.  Yet, there is very little apparent movement from the EC towards this goal while it remains enmeshed in multiple disputes and controversies. As organising the first diaspora vote will certainly face many challenges, vigorous debate should start now to ensure its smooth implementation by 2020.

Second, transparency in electoral operations: Overall, the electoral process in Ghana is remarkably transparent and inclusive. Through the inter-party advisory committee (IPAC), political parties and key stakeholders are kept apprised of operational processes and key decision throughout the electoral cycle. The introduction and increasing reliability of biometric registration have increased public confidence and enhanced transparency at the polling station level. Reforms introduced prior to the 2016 elections as a result of court challenges have boosted the role of presiding officers at constituency level in the declaration of results, thus bringing openness closer to the people. But there is on crucial step in the electoral process that has defied openness and clarity over all electoral cycles: the declaration of final results.  By law, the electoral commissioner is the only one authorised to declare the final results of presidential and parliamentary elections. In practice, this has translated to tallying results from the constituencies in a centralised “strong room” at EC headquarters. Although representatives of political parties and other independent observers are allowed to witness the tallying, the process remains opaque in the public mind. The notion that EC officials actively “cook” results of the governing party is a constant refrain. This is the Achilles heel of the electoral process in Ghana, which has dogged every election since the advent of the fourth republic in 1992.

Ghana could learn from other countries to resolve this nagging problem. Nigerian electoral officials and political observers are openly admiring of Ghana’s electoral process and admit to learning from it to improve their own elections. So, Ghana can return the favour and learn from a positive experience of its larger neighbour. The Nigerian electoral commission managed the announcement of final results of the April 2015 Presidential and legislative in a manner that conveyed transparency.  The parade of presiding officers, preponderantly vice-chancellors and eminent professors, to announce the results of constituencies they oversaw added gravitas and reassurance to the sense of transparency. The spectacle was the opposite of the “strong room” concept. In the honoured tradition of Ghana-Nigeria one-upmanship, Ghana must try to outdo Nigeria in the electoral transparency sweepstakes by taking the final tallying out into the open. What a sight it would be if results could be projected onto big screens at stadiums across the countries and broadcast live on national and international TV for all to see.  The knowledge and technology now exist to achieve this. Furthermore, as the declaration of results has effectively been decentralised to the constituency level and constituency results are available to the media and election watchdogs within a few hours after the close of voting, results can be released progressively as they become available. If this is done (as indeed happens in many advanced democracies) citizens will not have to sit on tenterhooks for 48 or 72 hours after polls close while results are being tallied and verified (whatever that means) before final release. This will reduce tension in the country.  It will also ease pressure on the electoral commissioner, who must bear the onerous and thankless responsibility of unveiling the individual elected by the people to lead them.

Third, expeditious resolution of electoral disputes: Overall, election-day violence in the fourth republic has been rare, despite media-fuelled high tension in the run up to elections. But there have been high-profile instances of disruption of the electoral calendar due to disputes. In 2012, a dispute over the election of NDC candidate John Mahama dragged on at the Supreme Court for eight months before it was finally determined in his favour. This was after Mr. Mahama, declared winner by the EC, had already been sworn in and continued to exercise the functions of President. This situation is clearly awkward and its recurrence must be avoided at all cost. To this end, a judicial regime must be instituted that enables election-related litigation to be resolved expeditiously, before newly elected officials are sworn in. This may call for instituting special election courts to address election-related litigation in a timely manner. Elected officials, once judicially cleared, can then focus on governance and service delivery.

The quick resolution of electoral disputes also has implications for post-election transitions, especially when it involves a change from one party to another, as has happened three times in the fourth republic. In 2008, disruption at a few polling stations in Tain constituency led to an unprecedented “third round” of voting, which pitted the NPP’s Nana Akuffo Addo against then opposition leader Professor Atta Mills. The rescheduled election, held on 28th December, had the nation sitting on tenterhooks and messed up everybody’s Christmas and New Year. Thus there was an indecently hasty transition from the election to the inauguration of the new President on 7th January 2009 as constitutionally mandated. In an apparent effort to avoid a recurrence of the Tain situation, legislation was tabled in mid-2016 to move the elections from December to November, presumably to allow for sufficient time for a transition even if there is a “third round” of voting. The timing of the amendment, tabled when partisan tensions and suspicion were at fever pitch, probably influenced the decision to reject it at the time. So, this is not a fatal setback. If another bill can be introduced in 2018 or early 2019, which proposes a decent time lag of, say, six to eight weeks between the election and the inauguration of the incoming administration, it would have a greater chance of success.  Such an amendment would kill two birds with one stone: it would allow time for resolution of electoral disputes and enable a decent transition to ensure a smooth transfer of power and continuity of administration.

Fourth, Creating A Viable Electoral Register:  Throughout Africa, establishing a viable and credible electoral register is a contentious issue. Ghana has not been spared its share of voter registration controversies. Each electoral cycle embroils the country in much sound and fury over who is eligible to register to vote, with various political parties and even the EC itself facing accusations of fraudulent manipulation through padding electoral rolls, registration of underage voters, importation of voters from neighbouring countries and other shenanigans. Progressive digitalization, which has enabled the creation of a biometric electoral register, has minimized but not eliminated the suspicions and challenges. The root of the problem may be traced to the absence of viable national identification and civil registration databases, which could form the backbone of an electoral register. In the absence of a viable national identification system, conducting voter registration in the last year before elections, in the midst of election campaigns, is a sure recipe for controversy.  Fortunately, Ghana appears to be on the verge of launching its first comprehensive national identification system. Thus, civil society groups and other advocates for fair and credible elections will do well to mount pressure on the National Identification Agency (NIA) to rush the development and implementation of the long-awaited system.

Finally, Ensuring Peace and Security for Elections: Ghana’s national peace architecture, formulated with the collaboration of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has been hailed throughout Africa and beyond. It has inspired other countries, such as Nigeria, which drew upon the Ghana experience to create its own National Peace Committee for the April 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. The peace architecture, which finds expression through a multi-level Ghana Peace Council, provides a robust framework to detect and counter any currents of hate or threats to peace and security. But new threats are emerging, which the National Peace Council must confront before the next electoral cycle.  The peace architecture needs to be re-energised and strengthened, especially at regional and district levels. Some recent developments should particularly concern peace advocates in the run up to the 2020 elections. First is the recent upsurge in violent crime, notably armed robbery and the phenomenon of land guards, which have elicited the intervention of the President himself. The institutionalisation and apparent tolerance of vigilante groups sponsored by major political parties constitute a significant security threat, particularly as they undermine national security institutions. Ghana also cannot ignore the unstable security situation across its borders. The sporadic terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, the months-long opposition agitation against the ruling government in Togo, and the restlessness of elements of the Ivorian army drawn from the ex-rebellion must all be watched carefully. Therefore, the national peace architecture should emphasise strengthened alliances with media watchdog institutions, such as the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), and regional security and early warning organisations like the West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP). The MFWA’s media monitoring program ahead of the 2016 elections publicly named and shamed purveyors of intemperate speech and was credited with minimizing hate speech in broadcast media. WANEP’s pan-ECOWAS coverage and analysis can provide early warning on threats from Ghana’s neighbourhood. The early warning should include monitoring the flow of small arms across the ECOWAS region.

In conclusion, Ghana can minimize election-related acrimony by avoiding an election-year gridlock of needed electoral reforms. The authorities should accelerate implementation of the national identification system. Finally, peace advocacy effort efforts should address both domestic security challenges, including party-sponsored vigilantism, and potential sub-regional threats arising from instability in countries across its borders.

Prologue

On 3^rd June 2015, disaster struck Accra in spectacular, biblical, fashion. Flood waters fire extinguished over 150 souls at a fuel station near the Kwame Nkrumah Circle. The disaster generated a national debate on urban waste management, notably the disposal of plastic waste, unregulated informal settlements and the link between poor drainage and perennial flooding in Accra. The tragedy also nearly drowned this article as it occurred about a week before its scheduled publication on the Okumah Blog. The ensuing debate made me rethink the thrust and timing of the article.

Unsurprisingly, much handwringing and pontification followed the June 2015 tragedy. Pundits of all stripes emerged to offer solutions or engage in I-told-you-so self-congratulation; men of God issued calls for prayers (to God, Allah and various other deities); and a raft of seemingly uncoordinated official actions and reactions ensued. To general applause, the city authorities embarked on willy-nilly demolition of fuel stations, unauthorized structures built on waterways and, most dramatically, the razing down of parts of Old Fadama, popularly called Sodom and Gomorrah, Accra’s most infamous slum. The sense of action somewhat mollified residents horrified and traumatized by the disaster, and the much-reviled Mayor of Accra gained a sudden, if eventually short-lived, spurt in popularity.

And then nothing… No new policies, plans or projects were unveiled, and some of the actions announced with much fanfare, such as the dredging of the Odaw River, seemed to stall or drift into the familiar quagmire of partisan political bickering. Then, on 12^th July, 2015 then President Mahama released a plastic trial balloon. He threatened that the Government might consider banning the use of plastics, “go the Rwanda way”, as he put it. This announcement unleashed a furious, and generally well-informed, debate on the management of plastic waste among stakeholders – manufacturers, consumers, environmental advocates and activists. The Minister responsible for the environment then followed up the presidential threat with an announcement that the production and importation of ultra thin plastic (under 60 micrograms) would be banned starting August 2015. August came and went. Nothing…

Months passed by. The harmattan arrived to dry out the rains and our memories. As residents began to complain about the dust and prayed for rain, the memory of 3^rd June receded. The cycle was repeated in 2016, with the predictable deluge of June and July. Still nothing. And then, dramatic change: elections on 8^th December 2016 ushered in a new government – and renewed hope that things might be different.

At this point, with Easter and a new rainy season once again upon us, I decided to resurrect my blog.

Chapter One: A Tale of Three Cities

As a rule, I am skeptical of newfangled rankings and lists – top 10 this, top 50 that. They seem to sprout everywhere nowadays. Surely, some rankings are sound and credible. These take the trouble to detail the criteria and methodologies used to arrive at their findings. Examples are the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report and UNDP’s Human Development Index. Similarly, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the Mo Ibrahim Index and the Afrobarometer survey, which purport to measure good governance, are generally trusted. But for each credible ranking, dozens of sham ones are spawned. Many seem conceived to promote specific agendas or advocate certain causes.

Thus, I was naturally suspicious when I chanced upon a list of “Top 10 Cleanest Cities in Africa” published by a group called Africa Ranking, which claims to “provide in-depth information on the most interesting facts about Africa”. My suspicion increased when I noticed that my beloved Accra, at number seven, ranked higher than Windhoek, at number 10. (Incidentally, Windhoek was ranked the “cleanest city in Africa by another website, Skyscrapercity.com) I asked myself: Did these guys see the Odaw River? Did they smell the Korle Lagoon? Did they visit Sodom and Gomorrah?

1.1 The Miracle of Kigali

But when I saw Kigali ranked number one, I believed it. I first visited Kigali in 1985. At that time, a French colleague of mine described the city as “une grande bananerie” – one big banana plantation. That description was apt. The city did indeed seem to comprise mostly thatch-roofed huts and a few modern buildings scattered amidst lush, mostly banana, foliage. Fast forward to the 21^st century, and we have a different image. In the past decade or so, Kigali has undergone a near miraculous transformation. Today it is undoubtedly among the cleanest and most ordered cities anywhere. The thatch-roof houses have disappeared. And there isn’t a stray piece of paper, plastic or any kind of litter to be found anywhere. How did this change happen?

For most outsiders, the mention of Rwanda and its capital, Kigali, evoke sheer tragedy and horror. And for good reason: the 1994 genocide was certainly one of the greatest atrocities of the past century. But the other story of Rwanda, which deserves to be told and which Rwandan authorities strive, with mixed success, to tell the world is one of a nation motivated to bury its inglorious past, a nation rising, like a phoenix, from the ashes of shame and anguish to rebuild and grow. Rwanda in the 21^st century is a country obsessed with success and impatient with distractions to its quest to shine. This success must be achieved against severe odds: entrenched poverty, shortage of land and natural resources, difficulty of access due to its landlocked status and, of course, the need to rebuild trust and unity among a populace still traumatized by memories of genocide.

What Rwanda possesses is a leadership with a laser-sharp focus on socio-economic development. Its forward march to development is executed with remarkable discipline. In Rwanda, zero tolerance for corruption is more than a mere slogan. Government officials, from ministers and ambassadors to provincial and district chief executives are regularly called upon to publicly account for their stewardship. Each official’s performance is assessed against clearly defined indicators and targets. Rewards and sanctions are meted out accordingly. For instance, every three months, the Kigali City Council, along with its three districts – Nyarugenge, Kicukiro and Gasabo – organizes Public Accountability Days to which all residents, organizations and associations are invited to participate and question their leaders.

It is through this prism of accountable and results-oriented governance that one should view waste management in Kigali. The City Council operates an efficient system amidst what it acknowledges are a weak infrastructure coupled with severe financial and expertise constraints. In the medium term, it plans, with the assistance of external partners, to construct a sewerage system, an off-site treatment plant and a sanitary landfill, critical waste management infrastructures it currently lacks. But meanwhile the council intends “continuing, expanding, building-up and strengthening those services within our own capacities, required for sustained solid and liquid waste management system.”¹

Experts in the field talk about the 3Rs of waste management: Reduce, Reuse and Recycle. Rwanda has given a politically courageous twist to the first R, the concept of waste reduction. It has banned the use of all non-biodegradable plastic throughout the country! That policy alone has significantly reduced its waste management burden. Any casual observer can attest to the destructive impact of the widespread use of plastic bags in most cities in Africa. They litter the streets, choke the drains, pollute water bodies, poisoning and choking fish to death en masse. Yet most African governments seem to be at a loss on how to handle the problem.

Not Rwanda. The authorities, recognizing their limited capacity to reuse and recycle plastic waste, just banned it. The effect has been dramatic. As the table below shows, less than 2% of waste collected in the three districts of Kigali city is plastic-based. And most of this is of a type that can be collected and recycled. Rather, about 95% of the urban waste is from food, paper, grass, textile or wood, which are biodegradable and compostable. See Table below.

Types of Waste Generated in Kigali, by District

Source: Kigali State of Environment Report and Outlook 2013. Table 4.4

Another reason Kigali is clean is the way waste is collected. Designated private companies collect the waste directly from households, which paya nominal fee for the service. Fee-based household waste collection indeed exists in most African cities. But they are usually restricted to more affluent neighborhoods. Most other residents have to deal with container bins in their neighborhoods. These bins are supposed to be emptied regularly by waste management contractors. However, more often than not, the waste is not evacuated promptly and they become rubbish dumps. By removing these from the chain of waste management, the Kigali city council eliminated a significant environmental nuisance and health hazard.

Thus, Kigali, through a sensible and low-cost policy on plastic waste and a household-based waste collection system has managed to overcome its infrastructure and resource deficits and become arguably the cleanest city in Africa.

1.2 Moroni – A Modest and Precarious Success

In 2007, the first thing that struck a visitor to Moroni, the capital of Comoros, was the filth. I was one such visitor. Garbage and rubbish were everywhere; there was no attempt to hide them. Indeed the favorite dumping ground for household waste was “la corniche”, the beach road, which was also the city’s main highway. People transported waste from their homes (in head pans, wheelbarrows and taxis) and dumped them by the roadside. There were flies everywhere, as well as rats, mongooses and all sorts of vermin. The impact of all this filth on the health of the population was devastating. Cholera was endemic, commonly accepted as a fatality. Dermatological and gastro-intestinal afflictions were common, especially among children. International health and development specialists openly expressed fear of a plague outbreak.

For those unfamiliar with this pretty Indian Ocean archipelago, a brief recap of its recent history as well as the political and governance context may be in order. Comoros holds the African record of coups d’état and other disruptions of government. From independence in 1975 to 2001, the country witnessed at least 26 successful or attempted coups d’état, three mercenary invasions and the assassination of three presidents. Underneath all this turmoil flowed an undercurrent of separatism driven by the difficult co-habitation of the three main islands and an ongoing dispute with France for sovereignty over Mayotte, the fourth Island in the archipelago.

The turbulence has abated somewhat since the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) brokered a new constitution in 2001, which created the Union of Comoros, a shaky federal structure with a rotating presidency among the three constituent Islands – Grande Comore, Anjouan and Moheli. But such a long period of instability leaves a lasting imprint. Politics remains divisive and riven by suspicions. The threat of separatism is never far below the surface. Indeed in 2008, the Union government, with African Union endorsement and supported by troops from Sudan and Tanzania, invaded Anjouan Island to eject the separatist leader, Mohamed Bacar. Despite deep-seated poverty and other significant threats, including the fact that the main island sits on the very active Karthala Volcano, politicians prefer to engage in “la politique politicienne” (politics for politics sake), an unending wrangling on issues of little apparent relevance to socio-economic development. The political volatility has weakened national institutions and the population’s faith in them. In this context, nobody cared about waste management.

In 2007, when I arrived in Comoros as the United Nations Resident Coordinator, I convinced the UN country team to tackle filth in the capital, Moroni. Following a study commissioned to propose a sustainable waste management solution, a simple, cost-effective approach was devised. This hinged on three key components – collection, transportation and disposal of household waste. The minimalist approach reflected the modest resources available for the project.

The first challenge was to tackle waste collection from individual homes. This is critical to any urban waste management system. As waste is generated every day and people cannot live with waste in their homes, the prompt collection and evacuation of household waste is essential. When city authorities fail to provide effective waste collection and evacuation services people seek to dispose of their waste any way they can. In Moroni, some attempted to burn the waste, emitting toxic fumes. Many dumped it around their own or neighbors’ compounds. Those who wanted their immediate environs to be clean transported their waste farther afield. Improvised dumpsites sprung up at various public places, including around the Chinese and French embassies, outside the offices of the constitutional court, the island’s main harbor and several points along the beach road, attracting pests and scavengers of all kinds.

Surprisingly, organizing household waste collection in Moroni proved to be quite easy. Evacuation services were organized twice a week. Waste management trucks parked at designated spots for one hour at a time and households brought their accumulated trash at the appointed time. After one hour, the truck moved on to another spot. An intensive communication and education campaign accompanied this effort. The level of compliance was amazing, debunking widespread belief among expatriate and local skeptics alike that “Comorians don’t care about waste management; they simply don’t see the filth”.

Transportation of waste from collection to disposal sites is often the most expensive and logistically challenging aspect of waste management. In Moroni, this hurdle also proved relatively easy to overcome. After much wrangling and negotiation, the city authorities provided two waste disposal trucks and the UN provided a third. For a population of less than 100,000 this proved adequate. The three trucks followed predetermined routes and schedules for collection and disposal as described above.

Waste disposal, on the other hand, presented two significant difficulties. The first was eliminating the improvised dumpsites, which had grown into veritable rubbish mountains. The second was to identify a place to dump all the waste collected. The project organizers tackled the problem of improvised dump sites by organizing a well-publicized “Clean Moroni” campaign over three successive weekends. The campaign mobilized hundreds of city dwellers, who volunteered their labor, equipment, even trucks to clear the waste from the offending sites. The Vice-President of the Union, the Governor of the Island, the Mayor of Moroni as well as several political leaders participated in the exercise. “No rubbish” signs were erected at cleared sites and any waste dumped there was promptly evacuated. In an audacious twist, the project organizers decided to convert four of the largest dump sites, near the harbor and on the beach road, into mini-city parks. Horticulturists were hired to clear the land, landscape the areas and install benches.

The second and most important difficulty was that the city had no operational landfill for a permanent and safe disposal of waste collected from homes and intermediate dumpsites. As an interim measure, a temporary landfill was created at the city’s old airport located a fair distance from human settlements. This temporary solution was planned to last for six months pending the identification of a more appropriate landfill site by the Island and city authorities. Unfortunately, six months proved to be an optimistic estimate. The quest for a landfill site was politically contentious and dragged on for years. Meanwhile, the temporary landfill was continually expanded until it began to stretch beyond environmentally safe limits.

Despite this setback, the household collection system was sustained. Inspired by the initiative, several neighborhoods organized their own street cleaning exercises on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis. Public-spirited merchants and other individuals provided “motivation” to neighborhood youth engaged in the cleanup in the form of cash, T-shirts, food and other in-kind rewards.

The results of the Moroni waste management project were palpable. Within weeks, the city was rid of the eyesore of uncontrolled and widespread rubbish. The city’s example was emulated by the Island’s two other major cities, Mitsamiouili and Foumbouni, which launched their own waste management projects, with the support of other development partners. It is perhaps no coincidence that, since 2009, there has been no major outbreak of cholera in the city. However, the absence of a permanent sanitary landfill site hangs over the city like a Damocles sword.

1.3 Accra – Sound and fury signifying nothing

Ghana is one of only half a dozen or so countries in Africa where democracy truly thrives. Electoral politics is plural and highly competitive. The press is free, even if somewhat cacophonous in the margins. And there is a vocal and increasingly professional civil society, which seeks to hold government to account. The international community and governance experts applaud, and Ghanaians are justifiably proud of these achievements.

But there is a flip side to this nascent democracy. Governments elected into power with razor-thin margins hesitate to take actions that might negatively affect their fortunes in the next elections. In place of bold policy action, governments resort to propaganda (strategic communication is their preferred term), a smoke-and-mirrors imitation of governance, which yields stagnation at best. This has led to policy drift and hesitancy in many areas. There is also lack of policy continuity, as successive governments have preferred to rubbish and abandon (sometimes perfectly laudable) initiatives by their predecessors. Waste management in Accra epitomizes this policy vacillation.

Many visitors to Ghana’s capital, especially other Africans, love and admire the city. They cite its friendly people, safety and security – and cleanliness. And therein lies the rub. Most residents of Accra would be shocked to learn that visitors find their city clean. Indeed two mayors in the past decade have seen their political careers come unstuck due largely to their failure to deal with the filth of Accra. The immediate past mayor teetered precariously on the brink of citizen revolt for the very same reason. So, why do visitors see a clean city and residents perceive one wallowing in filth? The fact is, unlike Moroni, Accra hides its filth well. All ceremonial streets, major highways, commercial and administrative districts as well as higher income residential neighborhoods are kept scrupulously clean. These are the areas most visitors frequent. But most residents see, and live with, a different waste management reality. And they complain quite loudly.

There is indeed much to gripe about. However, in this paper, we will concentrate on three main aspects: household waste collection and disposal; management of plastic waste; and poor drainage. These three constitute not only the most urgent and significant challenges; they also have major ramifications on the city’s economy, health and disaster risk. I also posit that they are problems that can be addressed relatively painlessly with common sense approaches.

Household waste collection and disposal in Accra – a virtual apartheid

When it comes to collection and disposal of household waste, Accra is really two cities, with nothing in common at all. In the more affluent neighborhoods waste management contractors collect waste from households regularly and promptly. Residents pay an economic rate for this service. The result is a generally clean environment. The story is different in other parts of the city, which casual visitors do not see. Here, driven largely by misguided politico-electoral considerations, politicians and city authorities proclaim low-income residents too poor to pay a fee for waste collection and thus contribute to a clean and healthy environment for themselves and their families. So, there is no house-to-house waste collection. Rather, residents transport their rubbish to large container bins located in the communities. Waste management contractors are paid by the city to collect and transport the waste to designated landfills or other disposal sites.

The system does not work well. Payment to contractors is based on the volume of waste evacuated. Despite the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) spending about 80% of its revenues on waste management, it struggles to pay the contractors on time. Frequent delays in payments to contractors mean the waste is not evacuated on time or not at all. Ghana’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that of the 2800 metric tons of solid waste generated daily in Accra, only 2,200 are evacuated. Thus 600 metric tons of uncollected waste accumulates daily and is simply left to rot in situ – or, when it rains, to run off into open drains. (Of this, more later.) In some of the poorer neighborhoods it is a common sight to see vultures and other scavengers swarming overflowing container bins right in the middle of residential neighborhoods and markets.

An overflowing container bin in Accra (Source: Fei Baffoe, B, Busch, G, 2009: Solid Waste Management in Accra, Ghana, Anaerobic Digestion as an Appropriate Option prior to Landfilling, Journal of Solid Waste Technology and Management, 35(2):66-67

The plastic curse: litter, litter everywhere

In Ghana, as in many African countries, plastics are the packaging material of choice. Everything you buy, from a street hawker or roadside food seller, in a market or mall, is packed in a polythene bag. Plastic bags are popular because they are convenient and cheap. Increasingly, even the water you drink comes in a sealed plastic packet, commonly called “sachet” or “pure” water. Hundreds, of “pure water” companies all over the country produce and sell millions of this water-in-a-sachet every day. They are generally safe to drink. They also generate massive amounts of non-biodegradable waste.

In the absence of litterbins or other receptacles in public places and in many homes, plastic packaging is strewn indiscriminately in the open. Rain and wind then drive them to the open drains and water bodies, which they choke. Some find their way into the ocean. It is not uncommon for revelers at otherwise pristine beaches to be confronted with tons of plastic-laden waste blown back by the tide. And fishermen plying their trade close to the coast report many instances of shoals of fish choked to death by plastic waste and other toxic materials.

Residents moan and whine about the plastic waste. City, health and environmental authorities join in this chorus, complaining loudly about “irresponsible” littering by an uncooperative populace. But nobody does anything about it. There is too much at stake. The sachet water business has blossomed into a huge industry, providing employment and livelihood for many thousands of otherwise jobless Ghanaians. In September 2014, the National Association of Sachet and Packaged Water Producers (NASPAWAP) estimated that there are over 3,000 sachet water producers in the Accra-Tema metro area alone. Another 3,000 dot the rest of the country. Industry players estimate they contribute up to 100,000 direct and over a million indirect jobs² nationwide. These numbers confer significant clout on NASPAWAP, which has become a strong lobbying force. In the highly competitive politics of Ghana, no politician can ignore these numbers. They also give pause to over-zealous regulators. Thus, occasional talk of a tax on sachet water to fund plastic waste management tends to fizzle out in the face of robust resistance by producers.

The overabundance of plastic has led to a fledgling plastic waste recycling industry. A variety of private sector and NGO initiatives have been launched to collect and recycle plastic waste following the 3R (Reduce-Recycle-Reuse) model. Two of the major players in the field, Zoomlion and J Stanley Owusu & Co., have initiated industrial-scale 3R projects, which aim to convert plastic waste into pelletized fuel for use in kilns. Other smaller companies, such as Jekora Ventures and Trashy Bags contribute their bit. But these initiatives do not match the scale of the problem.

Clogged gutters and stagnant lagoons

Poor drainage aggravates waste management problems in Accra. Those familiar with the topography of Accra know that most of the city is encased in hills stretching from Macarthy Hill, Weija and Tantra Hill in the west and northwest through Pokuase and the University of Ghana in the north and then eastwards towards Peduase and the Akuapem mountains. Inside the concave formed by these hill formations lies the bulk of the city – the central business district, government ministries and residential areas where more than half of 3 million residents of the city live. All of this is flatland and, when it rains, much of it becomes wetland.

Why is the topography of Accra germane to its waste management? It is because the city has a notorious drainage and sewerage system. The open drains constructed in colonial times still crisscross the city. Mostly, these have become receptacles for dross and litter of all kinds, but increasingly of plastic waste. When it rains, the effluvium from most of the open drains flows in one direction – towards the Odaw River. This “river”, now merely one big waste receptacle, runs from north to south for some 10 km towards the sea. But it never reaches the ocean; its access it blocked by the Korle Lagoon into which it empties its contents.

The Odaw River and Korle Lagoon, which now form a single co-mingled water body, represent a spectacular failure of waste management, and indeed city planning. It does not take excessive imagination to picture a clean and blue waterway running down the middle of Accra like the Thames in London, the Seine in Paris or the Rhine and Danube in Belgrade. Rather, on the shores of the Odaw and Korle have sprouted various markets, business and informal settlements, including the infamous Old Fadama, commonly called, with some justification, Sodom and Gomorrah. Rather than lagoon and river cruises and restaurants, the Odaw and Korle showcase the biggest eyesore – a health and environmental calamity in the city.

Images Old Fadama (“Sodom and Gomorrah”)

As mentioned above, we limit ourselves in this article to the three issues only. But there is more. For instance, we have not tackled the scandalous liquid waste (mis) management of the city. On this topic, an excellent article by Sjaak van der Geest and Nelson Obirih-Opareh titled “Liquid Waste Management in Urban and Rural Ghana: Privatisation as Governance” states: “If availability of toilet facilities and the method of removal and disposal are indications of level of development, the city of Accra cannot be rated high on the scale of development. The infrastructure of the Accra central sewage system is inadequate. In 1999, there were less than 1,000 units connected to the central sewage system (GW&SC 1999). In most places, the infrastructure for waste management is either non-existent or in a deplorable state. As Akuffo (1999) noted, there are about 18 sewage systems and sewage treatment plants in Accra, but none of them is operating according to plan. The system that was built for Central Accra in the early 1970s by the Busia government is no longer adequate. There are few connections and insufficient links to water to enable flushing. In Accra, liquid waste management has broken down due to a lack of human, logistic and financial resources.” And, I would add, a deficit of political will and imagination. There is also the whole business of sanitary landfills, waste processing, recycling and waste-to-energy perspectives, etc.

But, let us return to the three waste management issues highlighted in this article – household waste collection and disposal; plastic waste management; and drainage/flood control.

Chapter Two: The way forward for Accra

So, let’s take the three issues one by one and consider possible solutions in the light of experiences from successful programs elsewhere in Africa.

2.1 Collection and disposal of household waste

For the purposes of this article, I include markets and other business premises along with individual dwellings. The short-term goal, say over a 12-month period, would be to institute a system whereby households and businesses transport their accumulated trash directly for collection by waste collection trucks, tricycles and other evacuation vehicles.

A tricycle-borne waste bin. Convenient for accessing high-density communities and markets

The frequency of collection could vary, from, say, daily in markets and business areas to once or twice a week in residential areas depending on their density. This is the first step to eliminating all container bins and other intermediate community waste dumps. As the examples of Kigali and Moroni demonstrate, household-to-truck waste collection is less intimidating than it might appear. With sufficient information and education, the population will readily comply. The flip side, of course, is that the waste collectors should keep to their advertised schedules in order to sustain the confidence of residents. Concurrently, a campaign should be launched to rid all communities of container bins and other dumpsites. It is important to involve concerned communities in these exercises in order to secure their buy-in for the new waste collection and disposal regime. Wherever feasible, the empty lots created by the removal of intermediate dumpsites should be replaced by green spaces.

The successful collection and evacuation of household and community-based waste depends on the availability of adequate sanitary landfills or other disposal facilities. This is a challenge, as current available landfill space can only accommodate about three quarters of Accra’s total waste generation. It may be necessary to employ emergency measures to identify or create temporary (but sanitized) landfill sites to receive the additional waste. One could envisage mobilization of the army corps of engineers, as well as resources of existing waste management companies to help create such disposal sites.

However, in the medium to long term, the goal should be to eliminate landfills altogether through the adoption of waste-to-energy technologies. Thus, it was heartening to hear Prof. Frimpong Boateng, the new Minister of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation state, at his parliamentary vetting, that this is precisely the new Government’s vision. Subsequently, the Minister has announced the Government’s ambition to derive up to 10 percent of national electricity output from waste by 2020. This is a laudable objective. It is also achievable. In recent decades, waste to energy (WtE) technology has been developed and applied in countries across the world, yielding a double benefit: minimizing the volume of waste and increasing proportion of clean, renewable energy. A variety of technological processes for WtE have been developed, including incineration, gasification, thermal de-polymerization, anaerobic digestion and fermentation processes. All these processes can produce electricity and/or heat directly or yield by-products, such as methane-rich biogas, ethanol and hydrogen, which can then be used to fuel energy production.

Indeed previous governments in Ghana have had this same laudable idea. But the WtE projects conceived have not come to fruition. The most recent, and probably most significant, example was the agreement signed in July 2015 between the Ministry of Local Government, on behalf of the Government of Ghana, and Armech Africa Limited to build an Integrated Waste Management System in Kpone, some 30 km from Accra, which would receive all the waste generated daily in Accra and, after extracting valuable recyclable goods, convert the remaining waste to electricity for the national grid. The technology proposed for the Kpone plant is up to date. “All waste is transferred to a Tunnel Bio-Reactor, a modularized above-ground landfill, which transforms outdated waste management by doing away with landfills and creating the cleanest bio-energy from waste”, according to the project proposal. As I write this, the status of this project is unknown.

So, why have perfectly laudable WtE initiatives failed to gain traction in Ghana, and what can the new government do differently to ensure a successful outcome? Maybe Ghana could learn from a couple of successful examples from elsewhere. First, Mauritius: this Indian Ocean island country of 1.2 million people touts itself as operating one of the best integrated waste management systems in the world, and certainly the best in Africa. According to the country’s Central Energy Board (CEB), “The Government of Mauritius’ energy policy encourages the use of renewable and clean energy to reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels and decrease greenhouse gas emissions; it aims to increase the use of renewable sources from 20% in 2016 to 35% by 2025 (…) The government has indicated that renewable energy will be an important aspect of the next budget, and it is currently developing a variety of plans in this field.  In 2014, a total volume of 2,937 GWh was generated, with only 20% from renewable sources, including bagasse (sugarcane waste). While bagasse remains the key source of renewable energy (16%), Mauritius derived the remaining 4% of renewable electricity generation from hydro, wind, landfill gas and solar.”  With two WtE plants due to come on-stream in the second half of 2017, the Government hopes to generate 8% of national electricity output from waste.

There are a couple of points to note and lessons to be learned here. First, the Government of Mauritius has a deliberate and consistent policy to reduce its carbon emissions by moving progressively towards renewable and clean energy. Thus, its WtE initiatives fit into a clearly defined vision and plan. This is different from the situation in Ghana where there has been a notable lack of policy continuity and coherence. Second, the Government is putting its money where its mouth is. Although the WtE and other renewable energy projects are private sector driven, the national budget accords renewable energy sufficient priority to ensure that projects promised are actually delivered.

For those who think such initiatives are easier to manage in Mauritius because it is a small country and, is therefore, “more manageable”, the following should give pause: According to Wikipedia, during the 2001–2007 period, global WtE capacity increased by about four million metric tons per annum. In China, there were about 434 WtE plants in early 2016. Japan is the largest user in thermal treatment of municipal solid waste in the world with 40 million tons.” Surely, China and Japan are no small countries. And neither is Indonesia, which as of June 2014 had a total of 93.5MW of installed capacity of WtE, with a pipeline of projects amounting to another 373MW of capacity. It is global bandwagon. Ghana should jump onto it.

2.2 Dealing with plastic waste

The example of Rwanda demonstrates what drastic policy measures can achieve in minimizing plastic waste. However, Accra and Ghana generally may not be amenable to the zero plastic solution in the immediate term. Sachet water is a major complicating factor. As pointed out earlier, the industry provides employment and livelihoods for hundreds of thousands of people throughout the country. It also provides other undeniable benefits. Ghanaians are drinking more and cleaner water than ever before, which is certainly beneficial from a health perspective. At funerals, weddings and other social events, water now predominates over beer and other beverages. So, aside the political consideration of risking the ire of over a million potential voters, there are economic, social and health aspects to consider.

So, what to do? I suggest a phased approach. Despite the brave efforts of some NGOs and private sector entities to collect and recycle plastic waste, the proportion of plastic waste recycled is infinitesimal relative to the quantum of its output. Second, there is no system in place for collecting the plastic waste, which ends up in the streets and gutters of Accra. In fact, a good citizen wishing to dispose of such waste after quenching his or her thirst with sachet water would be hard put to find a receptacle anywhere in Accra to dispose of it. Thus, in the short term, two things must be done. First, measures should be put in place to significantly increase the proportion of plastic waste that is recycled. Central government and city authorities should provide incentives, through tax relief and other policy measures, to induce the plastic waste recycling industry to significantly expand its capacity. New players may be induced to join the industry and existing recyclers with the right resources should be encouraged to increase their capacity. Concomitantly, measures must be instituted to collect plastic waste at source. The placement of plastic-only receptacles in public places could do wonders. At the household level, the separation of plastic from other waste could be envisaged as a means to facilitate recycling.

In the medium term, Government and city authorities should envisage a substantial reduction in the amount of plastic waste produced. With regard to sachet water, Government could, through tax incentives (and sanctions) decrease the proportion of sachet water relative to bottled water, which is easier to collect and recycle. A similar approach could be adopted for everything from shopping bags in upscale supermarkets and malls to the ubiquitous and unsightly black plastic bags used for packaging everything from smoked fish to roasted plantains and even soup in the streets and markets. Supermarkets, malls and upscale shops could be encouraged to introduce paper and reusable cloth bags in order to progressively reduce the quantity of plastic bags. In Mauritius and South Africa, shoppers who choose plastic shopping bags pay a special “plastic tax”. Plastic bags used to package food should be progressively replaced by reusable plastic dishes, which are more hygienic.

2.3 Draining the swamp

Better managing plastic waste and thus reducing its contamination of gutters and drains would surely reduce the plague of annual floods that afflicts Accra. But it would not be enough. The perennial flooding of Accra, no doubt aggravated in recent years by plastic waste, cannot be resolved until the Odaw River and Korle Lagoon have been unclogged, drained and provided an outlet to the ocean. As it is, most of the sewage and other effluents of the central, northeastern and northwestern parts of the city flow into the now stagnant water body. Without an outlet, when it rains, the open drains and gutters, also chocked by plastic waste, are backed up and their contents are spewed onto nearby streets, homes and markets. The sight is not pretty. And the outcome is not healthy. The now yearly outbreak of cholera during the rainy season is testimony enough.

Obviously, resolving the drainage problem of Accra is a costly and long-term proposition. It does not lend itself to the quick-fix interventions, which recent governments have resorted to. The topography of Accra and the city’s increasing population demand longer-term, more permanent solutions. City managers and planners are well aware of this. Indeed, over the years, through successive administrations, a variety of projects, have been announced to dredge the Odaw/Korle swamp and de-silt the drains and gutters that deposit their effluvium into its torpid pool. The most significant effort in recent years is the Korle Lagoon Ecological Restoration Project (KLERP), for which city authorities were said to have secured funding. However, the project appears to be at a standstill. So, everybody agrees that the cleanup and restoration of the Odaw-Korle swamp is important; the planning, engineering and financial aspects have been thought through, and the project deemed feasible. So, why have all these bright ideas come to naught?

Answer: complications – serious socio-political complications. Over the past several decades, large informal settlements, markets and other business have sprouted along the banks of the Odaw River and Korle Lagoon. These settlements include Korle Dudor, Adadinkpo, Old and New Fadama. The emergence of large human settlements and commercial activity has introduced a dimension beyond engineering and funding, which must be handled delicately. It calls for political courage and wisdom, and a vision of the transformation of the water body, which encompasses resettlement and/or rebuilding of some or all of these communities. The case of Old Fadama, in particular seems to confound political leaders. This settlement, originally conceived as a temporary refuge for persons displaced by development or sporadic conflicts within Accra, has, through successive waves of settlement and resettlement (including the huge numbers displaced by Nanumba-Kokomba conflict in the Northern Region of Ghana in the 1990s), morphed into a veritable township sheltering over 100,000 souls. Sodom and Gomorrah, as the settlement is commonly called, is the classic slum – overcrowded, unsanitary, crime and disease-ridden, with zero to poor access to public utilities and social services. Moreover, it is prone to inter-ethnic violence. The settlement is also the site of perhaps one of the largest e-waste dumpsites in the world. Some youthful residents consider this as a boon. They scavenge the dumpsite, setting fire to the discarded computers, printers and the like, with a view to harvesting for sale the cables, wire and coils buried in their entrails. This is a dangerous way to earn a living. The burning e-waste emits toxic fumes and pollutants, which pose a serious threat to health. But the youth are not daunted. For many, it is the only way to earn a living.

Clearly, these settlements must be “dealt with” before any comprehensive transformation of the Odaw-Korle channel can proceed or succeed. However, Sodom and Gomorrah, the Agbogbloshie and Timber markets as well as other nearby communities are voter-rich, a factor not lost on politicians who might consider dislodging them as part of an Odaw-Korle transformation project. Besides, in Ghana’s polarized and hyper-partisan politics, opposition parties have been rumored to actively sabotage efforts to relocate some of these communities in order to curry their favor and win their votes. Well-meaning NGO and human rights activists add another layer of complication. Their efforts to improve the deplorable living conditions and protect residents, particularly women and children, from abuse sometimes seem to reinforce the “squatters’ rights” mentality of residents.

While most experts agree that unclogging and draining the Odaw-Korle swamp is essential to resolving Accra’s flooding problem, it must go hand-in-hand with other ancillary works. The three main tributaries that feed the Odaw and Korle with effluvium are the Nima, Kaneshie and Agbogbloshie drains. These colonial-era open super-drains have become dumping grounds for solid and liquid waste. They must be covered. So long as they remain an open receptacle for waste, they will continue to contaminate the Odaw and Korle. A medium term goal should be to eliminate open drains in the capital. As a first step, all new city roads must be constructed with covered drains. In addition to staunching the flow of plastic and other waste into the Odaw and Korle, this will minimize a major environmental nuisance and health hazard in the city.

Chapter Three: Yes, We Can

Despite the multiple challenges cited above, Accra is better equipped than most African cities to overcome its waste management predicament. The city, and Ghana as a whole, possesses the substantial technical knowledge and capacity. The country’s leading waste management company, Zoomlion, is arguably the only genuine multinational waste management company in Africa. Zoomlion won and successfully executed contracts to clean up stadia in Angola, Equatorial Guinea and South Africa during the 2008 and 2010 Cup Africa Cup of Nations and FIFA World tournaments in those countries. Excluding Ghana, the company currently operates in six African countries: Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Zambia. In Ghana, through contracts with municipal, urban and district assemblies, it operates in towns and cities all across the country. The company has introduced several innovations, including the manufacture and deployment of tricycles to facilitate waste collection from hard-to-access communities and crowded markets.

Zoomlion also initiated the Accra Compost and Recycle Plant (AcARP) designed with an initial capacity to treat up to 600 tons of waste per day. The AcARP, sited at Agyen Kotoku in the Ga North municipality, is a public-private partnership (PPP) involving several government, NGO and private sector entities. But the most forward-looking initiative of Zoomlion is without a doubt the Africa Institute of Sanitation and Waste Management established in partnership with the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology(KNUST). The institute aims to develop local and regional capacities of waste management operators as well deepen the knowledge and conduct research to underpin policy formulation and planning. The institute complements the academic and research work undertaken in the field by Ghana’s leading universities, the University of Ghana and the KNUST.

The Africa Institute of Sanitation and Waste Management campus at Madina, Accra

In recent years, Zoomlion has veered into areas not directly related to its core waste management business. As mentioned above, it is also pursuing plans to expand its operations into an increasing number of African countries. It is hoped that these excursions will not lead the company to reduce its focus on leading the cleanup of Ghana through a massive expansion and enhancement of its services. For the task ahead is massive.

A noteworthy, albeit smaller, competitor to Zoomlion is J Stanley Owusu and Co (JSO). JSO, whose roots date back to quarrying in the 1960s, touts itself as a pioneer in waste management in Ghana, as it incorporated the first full-fledged waste management company in 1970. In addition to household and community waste collection and management, JSO builds and manages waste transfer stations and landfills. Through its two subsidiary companies, the Accra Liquid and Solid Waste Management Company and the Kumasi Waste Management Company, JSO is embarking on waste-to-energy projects in the two cities.

Buttressed by the research and knowledge generated by the universities and the institute, Zoomlion, JSO and other waste management companies operating throughout the country provide sufficient real and latent capacity to address the waste management needs of Ghana and its capital city.

Epilogue
Researchers and other experts who have studied the waste management debacle in Accra and other major cities in Ghana have identified the lack of political will and leadership as a major hindrance towards resolving the problem. Hence, the heading for Section 1.3: “Sound and fury signifying nothing”. Thus, the weight of expectation on the Government inaugurated in January 2017 is heavy. The Government has signaled that it will take environmental conservation and sanitation very seriously. The President in his State of the Nation address on 21 February 2017 cited the environment, notably preservation of water bodies and urban waste management, as key priorities of his government. The newly appointed Minister of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation is an eminent scientist celebrated for his competence and passion. Two brand new ministries have been created whose mandate includes a focus on environmental sanitation. They are the Ministry of Water and Sanitation and the Ministry of Zongo and Inner City Development. The Greater Accra Regional Minister and the Mayor of Accra have both declared waste management a key priority.

Any visitor to Ghana in the first four months of 2017 would be struck by the intense pro-environment fervor that has gripped the country. The media are inundated by citizens expressing outrage and disgust at the wanton pillage of our environmental treasury and the accumulation of filth in our cities. Politicians, pastors and opinion leaders of all stripes have leapt onto the bandwagon. While the social media campaign, #StopGalamseyNow³, has garnered the most public attention, there is also intense agitation to “do something” about urban waste management. Public awareness about environmental sustainability has surely dawned on Ghana.

Perhaps it is not coincidental or surprising that public awareness and agitation for action have intensified with the arrival of this new Government. The message of change it heralded, the boldness that has characterized some of its early initiatives and the clear signals that it is committed to tackling environmental head on have emboldened activists and given hope to the citizenry that the political will and leadership they have long prayed for may be at hand.

I also dare to hope, for I am convinced that we must and can conquer filth.

South Africa – Behind and Beyond Xenophobia

Through most of April 2015, the world’s attention was gripped by the xenophobic violence that swept across the rainbow nation, resulting in the deaths of several African migrants. Africans, in particular, were bewildered. Indeed bewilderment surpassed outrage in many instances. Why are our brothers killing us? That was the question on many minds and many lips. Whilst I do not presume to proffer a direct answer to this question I would like, through these pages, to expose some of the structural social and economic conditions of post-Apartheid South Africa, which may indicate the xenophobic violence as the tip of an iceberg of dangerous proportions.

Watching the distressing images of South African youth wielding weapons in the streets and hunting down fellow Africans it is easy to forget how much the country has progressed in many areas since the end of Apartheid. South Africans are quick to boast of having laid the foundations for a “non-racial, non-sexist, united and prosperous South Africa, and for a society based on fundamental human rights, equality and unity in diversity”, as the Medium Term Strategic Framework, 2014-2019 puts it. South Africans have built institutions and developed plans they hope will help achieve their lofty ambition as a nation. They point out, with some justification, that in 20 years, they have gone from an international pariah state to one whose counsel is sought, and often prevails, in the council of nations, be it at the United Nations, the African Union or, within their own backyard, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), where they are the undisputable champions. South Africa is the “S” in BRICS, an exclusive club of leading emerging powers, the others being Brazil, Russia, India and China. In its development plans, South Africa openly touts its desire to share its expertise with other, less endowed countries in Africa and beyond. South African investments are sprouting all over Africa, and iconic South African brands, from wines to DSTV, supermarkets to fast food chains, can be found all over Africa. Fellow Africans, fleeing economic hardship and poor governance at home, are trooping to the country in droves. This is all very impressive. But the narrative masks another reality.

The Triple Threat: Poverty, Unemployment and Inequality

In the past year, I have had the opportunity to work in South Africa, in a position that enabled me grasp the fundamental problems facing the society and economy. In simple, economic development terms, these can be reduced to three intractable, interrelated problems – poverty, unemployment and inequality. Government officials and economists refer to these problems as the triple threat, or triple challenge. The triple threat is not a mere slogan. The South African Government came to this definition through a deliberate process.

South Africa has a formidable development planning apparatus. The Economic Development Department (EDD) oversees the highly competent and well-respected National Planning Commission (NPC). Like many other institutions in the country, including Statistics South Africa, the Reserve Bank of South Africa, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the judiciary as a whole, the work it produces is more likely to generate consensus than controversy. Under the aegis of the EDD, the country has since the early 2000s thoroughly analyzed the challenges facing the economy and produced a number of development plans. The most significant among these are the New Growth Path (NGP), launched in 2010, the National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 (NDP), sometimes referred to as Vision 2030 or Agenda 2030, launched in 2013, and the Medium Term Strategic Framework, 2014-2019 (MTSF) conceived as a first-phase implementation tool for the NDP.

The NDP is a particularly impressive document. It is a long-term perspective plan, produced through an innovative process led by the world-renowned economist, Trevor Manuel, Finance Minister during the presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki but at the time Minister at the Presidency in charge of economic planning. The National Planning Commission (NPC) produced the NDP, a 480-page tome, which lays out a detailed road map leading to South Africa consolidating its position as a global economic powerhouse by 2030. The composition of the NPC itself was novel and unique. It was conceived as an advisory body consisting of 26 people drawn largely from outside government, chosen for their expertise in key areas. It was given a mandate to be “critical, objective and crosscutting”. Unfettered by the customary timidity of career civil servants, the NPC’s analysis was thorough and rigorous, based on the best available data and knowledge. Through this process, the triple threat of poverty, unemployment and inequality, was confirmed as the key impediment to the country’s development ambitions.

Bantustans and Townships: Dens of Poverty

Now, for a brief look at each of these three challenges. First, poverty: To most casual observers, it would appear incongruous to use the expression “extreme poverty” and South Africa in the same sentence. Many Africans think of South Africa as “our only first world economy”, an Eldorado at a par with the US and Europe, boasting a GDP per capita of $7,000 ($13,000 equivalent in purchasing power parity), whereas most other countries in the region are struggling to attain $1,000. Yet the reality on the ground is different for many South Africans. Severe income deprivation and abject living conditions are the lot of many.

The roots of poverty, like much else in South Africa, can be traced to the legacy of Apartheid. First, poverty is defined by residence. You are more likely to be poor if you live in the former homelands (or Bantustans) or in a township. To recall, the so-called Bantustans were the fictitious nations created by the Apartheid regime inside the territory of the Republic of South Africa and the then South West Africa, now Namibia, as “homelands” for black South Africans. (See distribution map below.) The Bantustans were carved out of the poorest quality land, guaranteed to yield hardly any agricultural produce and generally had no sound economic foundation. Thus, poverty was built into their conception. Not surprisingly, statistics show that poverty rates in the former Bantustans are double those in other rural communities.

Map of Distribution of Bantustans under Apartheid South Africa

Poverty is also concentrated in the townships, designed to house blacks working in nearby white communities. In rural areas, the townships harbored commercial farm workers and their families. In urban communities, townships housed blacks whose services were required to maintain the opulent lifestyle of whites. In mining areas, townships took the form of single-sex dormitories for miners, many of whom were imported from neighboring countries like Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique. All townships had one thing in common: they were built a safe distance from the white communities they served. Township life has often been romanticized. Townships were, and still are, ebullient and lively. Artistic creativity thrived there, producing the wonderful music loved throughout the world. The anti-Apartheid struggle also found its genesis there. But life in the townships was hard. Daily, black African workers would sally forth in the morning to work in white neighborhoods, women mainly as housemaids and men to carry out other menial jobs. Before dark, they trekked back to their township homes, where there was no water, electricity or sanitation. But those were the lucky ones; the vast majority of township residents had no jobs at all. The townships bred the typical ills of poverty: violence, disease, substance abuse and alcoholism…

Such living conditions still exist in some townships

Since the end of Apartheid some townships have been dramatically transformed, taking advantage of the Government’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and a township eradication program designed to move millions of township dwellers into decent, low-cost housing. (Each new dwelling offers electricity, water and modern sanitation.) Thus, Soweto (from South West Township) has become a bustling, modern mini-city that attracts tourists in droves because of its storied past. But the success story of Soweto is not repeated everywhere. Millions of township dwellers remain mired in degrading poverty.

Unemployment, Structural Transformation and Growth: A Catch 22 Conundrum

Now, Unemployment: Finding decent work for the black population is a big headache for South African authorities. Officially, the unemployment rate stands at 25 percent. Among young people 15 to 24, it rises to 50 percent. In some former homelands and townships, figures of 75 percent and above have been cited. The Government is fully apprised of the problem. Indeed the New Growth Path, which was formulated in the latter years of President Mbeki’s tenure, focused largely on the unemployment question, setting a target of five million new jobs within 10 years.

Unfortunately, there are not quick fixes. The difficulty in tackling unemployment stems from two main causes: the inherent structure of the economy, and an anemic growth rate. South Africa’s economy is caught in a peculiar structural trap. To paraphrase former President Mbeki, South Africa is a country where the first world and the third co-exist. The factors and processes of production are those of a typical high-income economy whereas a large segment of the population lives in conditions of a low-income economy. Agriculture is highly modernized and commercialized. There is hardly any peasant farming or artisanal fishing, occupations that employ large proportions of the population in most African and other developing countries. Commerce and industry, including mining, are similarly structured, dominated by large corporations that employ modern machinery and production techniques, which exclude those without specialized skills or training.

Unlike most countries in the region, where the informal sector thrives and constitutes a huge absorber of labor, this segment of the economy hardly exists in South Africa: no petty traders, no street hawkers, no galamsey¹ operators, no hole-in-the-wall or kiosk-based tailors, seamstresses and mobile money agents. The NDP estimates that small business employs less than 40 percent of the working population. This compares with nearly 70 percent in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and probably over 90 percent in most African countries. The NPD sets a target for small business employment at 90 percent by 2030. There is a general consensus that rapid expansion of the small business sector must drive the economic transformation that South Africa desperately needs. To this end, a new Department of Small Business Development was created after the 2014 elections. The strategies proposed for growing the small business sector include large-scale skills and vocational training and freeing up land for small and medium scale farming. These strategies, if adhered to and implemented, would constitute a step change from the way the authorities have dealt with unemployment in the past.

However, for these projects to materialize and generate decent jobs on a mass scale, the economy must grow at a robust pace. The NDP estimates that, to achieve the agenda 2030 objectives, the economy must sustain an annual growth rate of 6 percent. This is not an overly ambitious target. Many countries in the region have reached or exceeded similar growth rates in recent years. Ethiopia has maintained an average annual growth rate of 11 percent over the past decade. The problem is that South Africa is far from achieving this growth rate. In the early 2000s, growth hovered around 4 percent. However, the country has been slow to recover from the global financial crisis of 2008 and in the past couple of years the economy has struggled to attain even 2 percent. The economy faces a Catch 22 conundrum: it must transform in order to grow; yet it must grow in order to generate the resources needed for transformation. Clearly, bold and creative political decisions are needed to cut through this conundrum.

Inequality: A Color-coded Legacy of Apartheid

Finally, inequality: By many estimates, South Africa is among the most unequal societies in the world, if not the most unequal. The country’s score on the GINI coefficient or index, the UN-endorsed measure of income inequality, is currently 6.9. The NDP aims to reduce this to 6.0. This would still make it among the highest in the world. Inequality in South Africa arises from, and is intertwined with, poverty and unemployment. It is also one of the biggest legacies of Apartheid. Under the system of separate development, inequality was strictly color-coded: whites earned most of the income and owned most of the resources, whilst blacks at the bottom of the social pyramid, earned a pittance and owned almost nothing. In between, coloreds and Asians scraped by.

Unfortunately, the end of Apartheid has not erased inequality. The structural inequalities created and maintained by apartheid still remain. Income inequality has actually worsened since the end of apartheid, although it has begun to de-racialize somewhat due to deliberate pro-black policies introduced by the ANC government.  Approximately 60 percent of the population (mostly blacks) earns less than the equivalent of US$7,000, the official GDP per capita, whereas the top 2.2 percent earns about US$50,000. However, inequality is not only manifest in income figures. It reflects in lifestyles, educational opportunities and attainment, access to decent work, life expectancy, burden of disease and, most glaringly, in housing and human settlements. Despite the best intentions of the NDP, current trends do not portend well. Unless bold measures are taken, inequality might even worsen, with a new twist: an increasing number of blacks, although still a tiny fraction, will join the ranks of the super-rich while the gap with the bottom 10 or 20 percent continues to widen.

Migrants, Easy Prey for a Frustrated Population

The persistent poverty and growing inequality baffle many poor South Africans. They ask themselves: We defeated Apartheid. Our own people now rule us. So, why are our conditions worsening? The Government is fully aware of these rumblings and the political and security risks they pose. Pending the eventual transformation of the economy, it has put in place a generous social protection system to cushion poor South Africans from further deprivation. This includes targeted cash transfers for the vulnerable, including subsidized housing, free healthcare and free basic education for the poor, as well as a universal quota of free basic services (water, electricity and sanitation). Indeed up to 15 percent of the national budget is spent on various benefit, subsidies and grants. Many economists question the long-term sustainability of this costly social protection program. But it is a clear political necessity.

Frustrated and exasperated, many black South Africans, who do not have the tools for deep socio-economic analysis, seek scapegoats. White South Africans (“Apartheid descendants”) continue to be routinely blamed and denigrated. Increasingly though, the focus is shifting to “corrupt politicians”. And the media, still largely controlled by the white establishment, gladly trumpet corruption scandals involving political leaders, of which unfortunately there are many.

African migrants are caught up in this maelstrom of unfulfilled expectations. Migrants make an easy and convenient scapegoat. They are easy to characterize as parasites swarming the country to steal South African jobs and degrade the moral fiber of society. In this regard, the situation in South Africa is no different from what pertains in many parts of the world, where migrants are routinely targeted and blamed for the failings of society or governance. The European Union aims to construct “ring of steel” to prevent African and Middle Eastern refugees and asylum seekers from crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Thousands of would-be immigrants have perished as a result. The Australian authorities have created immigrant-processing centers (modern day concentration camps really) on Christmas, Manus and Nauru islands in the Pacific to keep away asylum seekers and refugees mostly from southern and eastern Asia. A 600-mile fence has been erected on the US-Mexico border ostensibly to protect Americans from drug traffickers and terrorists.

The one crucial difference in the case of South Africa is that the anti-immigrant violence is not cloaked in the façade of democratic debate and deliberation of elected leaders, such as the emergency summit held in Brussels on 23 April to enable European leaders to express their outrage at the criminality of people smugglers and reaffirm their determination to protect their borders. Rather, the machete-wielding mobs in South Africa smack of lawlessness. It is an indictment of a government whose intelligence services failed to anticipate and prevent such an embarrassing show and whose security services failed to deal with the violence in a timely fashion. But perhaps, most of all, it is an indictment of a Government and leadership that have failed to inform and educate their people about the assistance many poor African countries offered, and the sacrifices some endured, to ensure the liberation of their brothers and sisters from the yoke of Apartheid.

A Prayer and a Dream: “We are all African”

Following this latest episode of xenophobic violence I pray for two outcomes in South Africa. First, that the country’s leaders succeed in transforming the society and economy within a generation, so it can become a true regional leader and global player. Secondly, I wish South African leaders to inform and educate their citizens about the role of outsiders, especially Africans, in the anti-Apartheid struggle. The teaching of the struggle cannot be parochial, because the struggle and sacrifices were not. The South African rainbow should not cover only the dozen or so racial and ethnic groups in South Africa. It must span the entire continent. Then South African can be a leader.
Fortunately, many South Africans themselves share this prayer. I end these reflections with an excerpt from the vision statement of the South Africa’s National Development Plan – Vision for 2030, which captures this dream in poetic and uplifting terms.
Who are we? 
We are Africans.
We are an African country.
We are part of our multi-national region.
We are an essential part of our continent. Being Africans, we are acutely aware of the wider world, deeply implicated in our past and present.
That wider world carries some of our inheritance to our experience of being African…
There is nothing more to be said.